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Shareholder Proxy Fight Expenses
Lawrence D. Stifel*
C ORPORATE DEMOCRACY IS REAL only to the extent that the
security holder is enfranchised to participate effectively in
the affairs of the enterprise-especially in the selection of its
directors. Much shareholder suffrage in the modern corporation
is merely nominal, because the wide dispersion of ownership
compels the shareholder to exercise his voting privilege by proxy.
Management often presents him with the right to elect but not to
select directors.
Participation in the selection of directors of publicly held
corporations requires expression through a proxy statement and
involves costs of solicitation. Case decisions have firmly estab-
lished management's right to use the corporate treasury for the
proxy costs of a statement of its slate of candidates for directors;'
the rationale being that management and incumbent directors
have a positive duty to inform the shareholders and to encourage
voting. Dissident shareholder groups, on the other hand, have
normally been required to bear their own proxy expenses. Their
active engagement in major corporate elections has been limited
to a few spectacular examples.
There is no statutory authority, either federal or state, to
indicate how shareholder proxy expenses shall be borne. In-
quiries were addressed by the writer to the Secretaries of State
of the States of the United States and of its territories, and the
72% return indicated neither statutes, rules nor regulations on
the subject in the respondents' jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, recent case law has permitted successful in-
surgent stockholders to gain reimbursement of their proxy ex-
penses from the corporation. These cases, as well as the un-
certainty and inadequacy of their application, require examina-
tion.
* Member of the Faculty of The School of Business Administration, Kent
State University; A.B., Harvard College; M.B.A., Harvard Graduate School
of Business; and a senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School. [Note: This
article will be used in part as contributed material for the forthcoming
Volume 3 of Oleck, Modern Corporation Law (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis).]
' The leading American case is Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (1934), following Peel v. London and North
Western R. R. Co., 1 Ch. Div. 5 (1907).
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Background
The corporate proxy device was not recognized at common
law, for the shareholder's voting privilege was a property right,
considered too personal to be delegated.2 "Where a corporation
will pass any interest, the common law will not suffer the mem-
bers of the corporation to give their assent by proctors or sub-
stitutes." 3 But commercial necessity dictated the separation of
ownership and management, and by the 18th century voting by
proxy was sanctioned by charter provisions and state legislation.4
The proxy has made the traditional legal and economic view
of the shareholder as sovereign theoretically compatible with the
divorce of management into a separate group. But with the
rapid industrial growth of this century and its attendant increase
in security holdings, a new type of mass corporate electorate has
developed; today totalling eight and one-half million individuals.5
The new shareholders, geographically scattered and possessing
only fractional interests, are more concerned with the dividend
rate than with decisions affecting the future management of the
enterprise.
Managers have become the stewards of the corporate assets,
conditioned of course upon continued shareholder approval.
However, this approval has become largely perfunctory as
management's access to shareholders' lists, connections with
financial circles, and use of corporate funds gave to management
control of the proxy machinery and, in a large segment of the
economy, control over the corporation itself. The natural
tendency of management to perpetuate itself in power is aided
by such legislation as that proposed in the Model Business Cor-
poration Act. It has been described by some eminent observers
as "an invitation to irresponsibility." 6 "It is easier to upset a
2 5 Fletcher, Cyc. Law of Private Corporations, 119 (1952).
3 Davies Rep. 116 (1607) as quoted in Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 Mich. L.
Rev. 38, 39 (1942).
4 Id., at 38-50.
5 Aranow and Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control (1957), in-
troduction by J. Sinclair Armstrong at xxiii.
6 One study indicated control was exercised by management in 44% of
the 200 largest non-financial corporations. Berle and Means, The Corpora-
tion and Private Property 94 (1933). As to the Model Act, see 1 Oleck,
Modem Corporation Law, 104 (1958), citing the much discussed article:
Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act; An Invitation to Irresponsi-
bility, 50 Northwestern U. L. R. 1 (1955).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/14
SHAREHOLDER PROXY EXPENSES
Ministry than a Board of Directors", quipped an English writer.7
If the interests of the owner-shareholders and the manager-
stewards coincide, the system is at least practically acceptable;
but the close scrutiny of the thirties revealed that the interests
were not necessarily identical.8 Types of management behavior
were often detrimental to ownership interests, and the share-
holders were often both unaware and impotent. Realization of
this condition prompted national legislation under the administra-
tion of the Securities Exchange Commission, addressed to the
problems of corporation excesses. Apparently the Model Corpo-
ration Act was a kind of counter to this national legislation.
Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowered
the S. E. C. to prescribe proxy solicitation rules which it con-
sidered "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." The S. E. C. restricted its first regula-
tions to the promotion of full and accurate disclosure of data on
the proxy forms, adhering to the express objective of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, rather than attempting to restore the share-
holders' power vis-a-vis management. Communications were im-
proved by Section 14, but the shareholders were still limited in
their franchise to the proposals and candidates management
presented to them.
In 1942, after continual revision and amendment, the Section
14 Proxy Rules were expanded to permit security holders to use
the management proxy statement in order to present proposals
of a proper corporate nature plus a supporting argument to the
shareholders for vote.9 Holders of securities traded on the na-
tional securities exchanges were given a tangible means of ex-
pression in corporate affairs. Shareholders, however, were still
barred from nominating directors by an express prohibition con-
cerning such use of Rule X-14A-8 and the mounting costs of
proxy solicitation. Unlisted securities (i.e., in the great majority
of corporations), still receive very little aid insofar as proxies and
other matters are concerned, under the federal securities laws.
[Note that S. E. C. Rule X-14A-1 et seq. now is Rule
240.14a-1 et seq. See, Brey, A Synopsis of the Proxy Rules of
the S. E. C., 26 U. Cinc. L. R. 58 (1957).]
7 Parkinson, Scientific Investment 134 (1932), as quoted in Loss, Securities
Regulation 522 (1951).
8 Berle and Means, op. cit. supra n. 6, at 119-125.
9 Rule X-14A-8.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Case Development
In 1950, Steinberg v. Adams 'o was decided, permitting op-
posing shareholders in a proxy contest to reimburse themselves
from the corporate treasury, if they were successful and acquired
stockholder ratification. In a stockholder's derivative action for
corporate funds disbursed both to the former management of the
company involved and subsequently to the winning insurgents,
the court, as a case of first impression, decided:
to draw no distinction between the "ins" and the successful
"outs" . . . Once we assert that incumbent directors may
employ corporate funds in policy contests to advocate their
views to the stockholders even if the stockholders ultimately
reject their views, it seems permissible to me that those who
advocate a contrary policy and succeed in securing approval
of the stockholders should be able to receive reimbursement,
at least where there is approval by both the board of
directors and a majority of the stockholders.'1
The court, however, did find a distinction in the rationale for
allowing disbursement to the successful "outs." The affirmative
duty to keep shareholders apprised of corporate activities and
issues in order to permit informed voting, which has justified
management's use of the proxy machinery, is not mentioned.
12
Instead an analogy is found to the allowance of counsel fees to
"the successful stockholder who brings a derivative action for
the benefit of the corporation." Whether or not a management
change will be beneficial is speculative, of course, unless the ex-
pression of the majority and a more fully informed electorate
are considered benefits per se.
The court apparently did not consider ratification to be a
prerequisite for reimbursement, but rather an added circum-
stance justifying it. Theoretically, shareholder approval is super-
fluous to confirm a benefit to the corporation, since the election
itself has been so viewed, and approval only adds authority to
acts already properly within the directors' discretion. As a prac-
tical matter, however, since successful opposition groups should
normally encounter little difficulty in securing approval, the
Steinberg case indicates the prudence of such action.
The limitations which had been established in earlier cases
on the proxy expenses management may charge to the corpora-
10 90 F. Supp. 604 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
11 Id. at 608.
12 Note 1 supra.
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tion, were applied by the court to the successful insurgents. Ex-
penditures must: (1) concern questions of corporation policy,
not mere matters of personnel, and (2) be reasonable. 13 The
court correctly acknowledged "that generally policy and person-
nel do not exist in separate departments," but perpetuated the
first requirement by assuming that the proxy contest involved a
policy issue since the plaintiffs failed to sustain the burden of
proof to the contrary. Although this has never been a significant
restriction, 14 the ambiguous requirement exists that contesting
shareholders must clothe their proxy attacks on management in
terms of corporate issues.
When the rule of reasonableness for solicitation expenditures
was formulated, only nominal expenses were contemplated; but
in the Steinberg case the insurgents' expenses exceeded $25,000
and in at least one case an opposition group has spent over a
million dollars. 15 There are no clear standards to determine if
proxy expenditures are reasonable, either in character or
amount, although two approaches have been used. They might
roughly be called criteria of informing and campaigning. The
former criterion restricts reasonableness to the actual cost of
notifying the stockholders of the meeting and explaining the
issues to them;' 6 the second standard permits management also
to defend its position and to attempt to persuade stockholders of
the correctness of its reasoning. In the two states, Delaware and
New York, where the law has developed, the courts have tended
to adopt the more liberal, second view.17 Examination of specific
expenditures in order to ascertain the bounds of reasonableness
is not illuminating except to reveal the courts' reluctance to dis-
13 Ibid. However, if the rationales for reimbursement differ, there might
be logical differences in the nature of allowable expenditures. In an action
to recover solicitation expenses from successful insurgent directors, one
court stated that the attack made upon the reasonableness of specific ex-
penditures would alone make the complaint sufficient, Cullon v. Simmonds,
285 App. Div. 1051, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 401 (2d Dept. 1955).
14 In only two cases have courts refused to permit management reimburse-
ment on the theory of absence of a policy issue; Lawyers' Advertising Co.
v. Consolidated Ry., Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187 N. Y. 395, 80 N. E.
199 (1907), and Rosenthal v. Edwards, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1174, Co. 1, 4F (Sup.
Ct., N. Y. County 1950).
15 A New York Central R. R. shareholders' meeting voted to reimburse in-
surgents' proxy expenses of $1,308,783. New York Times, May 27, 1955, p. 29.
16 Lawyers' Advertising Co., supra n. 14.
17 Aranow and Einhorn, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 495.
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allow expenditures unless clearly beyond the scope of "business
judgment." 18
In Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corporation,19
decided five years later, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the recoupment of proxy expenses by a successful opposition
group, upon shareholder ratification, against a stockholder's
derivative suit for restoration of over a quarter of a million
dollars. The 4-3 division of the judges and the three opinions
(3-1-3), however, accentuated the problems of the Steinberg
case without reference to it.
Both majority and dissent discarded the accepted logic of
corporate purpose for reimbursement, because the opposition
group had "no duty . . . to set forth the facts, with corre-
sponding obligation of the corporation to pay for such expenses."
The benefit theory, set forth in the Steinberg case, was also re-
jected and the decision of the Appellate Division that ratification
was crucial was upheld: "expenses should not be reimbursed by
the corporation except upon approval by the stockholders." 20
But the dissent reasoned that the approval was ineffective be-
cause the vote, although 16-1, had not been unanimous as re-
quired by New York law since the expenditures were devoid of
corporate purpose and ultra vires. The fourth concurring judge
did not mention the problem of reimbursing the insurgents but
based his decision upon the procedural requirement, stated by
the three prevailing judges, that the plaintiff had failed to go
forward with proof of excessive expenditure. The dissent, on the
contrary, maintained that the inference of impropriety had
shifted the duty upon the newly elected directors to justify their
conduct.
The division of the judges creates confusion also as to the
future course of New York law concerning the limits of reim-
bursement. The three prevailing judges adopted the accepted re-
is The use of professional proxy solicitors, considered unreasonable by
many legal writers [e.g., Friedmann, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Con-
tests, 51 Col. L. Rev. 951 (1951), and Mintz, Use of Corporate Funds for
Proxies and Other Expenses in Fight over Corporate Management, 8
N. Y. U. Intramural L. Rev. 90, 92 (1953)], and disapproved under the
strict rule of Lawyers' Advertising Co., supra n. 14, has become almost
normal. "The contest was conducted by... employment of proxy solicitors
and other devices not unusual in such campaigns," Steinberg v. Adams,
supra n. 10. Use of proxy solicitors was held proper in In re Zickl, 73
N. Y. S. 2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
19 309 N. Y. 168, 128 N. E. 2d 291 (1955).
20 284 App. Div. 201, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 273 (1954).
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quirements both of policy vs. personnel and of reasonableness.
A majority, however, the one concurring and three dissenting
judges, in varying degrees, apparently accepted neither, but
preferred to revert to the strict criterion of the Lawyers' Ad-
vertising Company case.21
The Steinberg and Fairchild cases establish the significant
new right of opposition shareholder groups to recoup their
proxy expenses from the corporation. This right enhances their
ability to participate "democratically," upon more equal terms
with management, in their corporate responsibilities.
Nevertheless the right is a very restricted one. There is still
a substantial difference between the insurgents' right to reim-
bursement if they win, and the manager's ability to defray ex-
penses as they occur. And it is only in Delaware (Steinberg)
and New York (Fairchild) that there is judicial authority for the
right. It is yet to be pronounced in other states. The cases have
also created extreme uncertainty regarding the necessity of
ratification, the nature of allowable expenses, the burden of
proving reasonableness, and the jurisdictional effect of the
decided cases. Related is the further question whether the law
of the state of incorporation or of the forum is to control such
actions. In the Steinberg case the federal court expressly applied
the law of the state of creation, but in the Fairchild case no
mention is made by the New York court that a Maryland cor-
poration was involved. 22
Such limitation upon this new corporate right, and the
courts' succinct and unsatisfactory reasons for its creation,
impose the additional need to evaluate carefully the basis and
desirability for its existence.
Reimbursement of Unsuccessful Opposition
Neither the Steinberg nor the Fairchild cases mentioned the
contestants' rights if they were unsuccessful or partially success-
ful with cumulative voting. This issue has been considered in a
single case, Phillips v. United Corporation.23 There the court,
lacking any precedents as authority, concluded: "It would be
21 Notes 14 and 18 supra.
22 Aranow and Einhorn, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 498.
23 Civ. No. 40-497, S. D. N. Y., May 26, 1948, appeal dism., 171 F. 2d. 180
(2d. Cir. 1948), as quoted in Aranow and Einhorn, op. cit. supra n. 5, at
514.
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difficult to find any reason for saddling plaintiff's proxy expenses
on the corporation."
However, the logic of reimbursement seems applicable re-
gardless of the ultimate outcome of a proxy contest. Unsuccessful
battles for control may benefit the corporation in terms of the
adoption of useful proposals, better informed shareholders, and
a more sensitive management. Responsible proxy solicitation
might also be furthered if reimbursement were not contingent
upon a frantic, all-or-nothing gamble for control. But it is im-
probable that incumbent boards of directors will ever volun-
tarily choose to compensate unsuccessful insurgents for benefits
received, and such reimbursement can be effected only through
other means.
Proposals for Proxy Expenses Reimbursement
The uncertainties of the Steinberg and Fairchild decisions
indicate how difficult it is for state courts to solve the legal and
economic questions of shareholder reimbursement on a case by
case basis. Consequently numerous methods have been sug-
gested to obtain a uniform and sensible means of reimbursement
of proxy expenses, enforced by either state or national legislation.
One feasible avenue of approach is the Securities Exchange Act,
Section 14 on Proxies, although its limited coverage and the
S. E. C.'s reluctance to deviate from the disclosure philosophy
would be obstacles to its use as a means of implementing a
reimbursement plan. Nevertheless, such factors as the language
of the Act itself, apparent legislative intent,24 and examples of
affirmative rules already adopted,25 indicate that its heretofore
limited perspective is not mandatory.
Proposed plans for the reimbursement of shareholder proxy
expenses include the following:
1. Reimbursement Ceiling-The stipulation of maximum
amounts of reimbursement for different types of companies, ap-
plicable to "ins" as well as "outs," has been suggested. 26 A
thorough study of the proxy requirements, by size of company,
24 Rule X-14 intends "power to control the conditions under which proxies
may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which
have frustrated the free control of the voting rights of stockholders," H. R.
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
25 E.g., Rule X-14A-4(b), requiring that stockholders be given oppor-
tunity to vote for or against each proposal on the proxy statement.
26 Gilbert, Dividends and Democracy 166-168 (1956).
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industry, and number and distribution of shares would be neces-
sary, although the result would be the imposition of an inflexible,
compromise figure. Reimbursement might better be based upon
a procedure analogous to the rule in the Public Utility Holding
Company Act which permits corporate proxy expense each year
of $1,000 plus the actual cost of solicitation;2 7 only the basic cost
of communicating would be allowed and contestants would be
required to use their own funds for campaigning. Since the right
of recoupment would not be contingent upon the group's success,
some selective limitation would seem necessary in order to
prevent drainage of the corporate assets by a multitude of dif-
ferent factions.
2. Reimbursement Dependent upon Degree of Success-One
indication of the cogency and value of the insurgents' platform
and claim to reimbursement is said to be the degree of success
they achieve at the ballot box. Reimbursement might be per-
mitted where a minority succeeded in electing a director under
cumulative voting, or obtained a certain percentage of the vote.28
A required percentage in the range of 10-15% has been sug-
gested; but this would also require study, considering among
other things the use of a variable standard for different situa-
tions and the results of voting on Proxy Rule X-14A-8 pro-
posals.29
3. Proportional Reimbursement-The extent of reimburse-
ment can be conditioned upon the degree of stockholder accept-
ance by the following formula, where x equals non-management
expenses to be allowed but not to exceed actual expenses:
management expenses allowed x
votes secured by management votes secured by opposition
This method would provide a ceiling automatically equalized in
relation to management activities, and at the same time screen
contestants by the extent of their success.30
27 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 824, 15 U. S. C.
§ 79 1(e) (1952), Rule U-65, 17 C. F. R. § 250.65 (1949).
28 Friedmann, op. cit. supra n. 18, at 962-64.
29 Of the 229 X-14A-8 proposals voted on in the period from 1948-51, 85%
received over 3% of the vote, 70% over 5% of the vote, and 40% over 8%
of the vote. Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: the Corpora-
tion Gadfly, 19 U. Chicago L. R. 807 (1952).
30 Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sov-
ereignty, 41 Calif. L. R. 393, 436 (1953).
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Shareholder Use of the Management Proxy
It has been argued that the proxy statement does not belong
to management exclusively, but ethically is the property of the
corporation and the shareholders, who should have free access
to it.31 Authorizing security holders to use the management
proxy form to nominate their directors is an alternative to reim-
bursement. The right would supplement the ability to solicit
proxies independently but permit the initiation of nominees
without the financial burden of a separate statement.
Restrictions would be necessary in order to prevent irrespon-
sible nominations, although experience with Proxy Rule X-14A-8
has indicated an intelligent use.8 2 Suggestions have been made
for the forfeiture of a substantial deposit if a set percentage of
the vote is not obtained, 33 and for the requirement that nomina-
tors hold a minimum block of stock; 5000 shares in one example.
34
The proposal could be realized simply by an extension of
Proxy Rule X-14A-8 to include the nomination of directors,
which it now excludes. 35 With certain restrictions, shareholders
would be permitted to place candidates for director on the
management proxy with the personal information required by
the S. E. C. and a supporting statement of a specified length. Such
objections to the proposal as the limited authority of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, the difficulty of procedural accommodation
to varying state election statutes,36 and the presence of devices to
escape the proxy regulations,37 do not compel abandonment of
the idea.
31 Gilbert, op. cit. supra, n. 26.
32 Emerson and Latcham, op. cit. supra, n. 29. Less than 2% of the man-
agement proxy statements filed with the SEC contained stockholder pro-
posals. 16 SEC Ann. Rep. 42 (1951).
33 Gilbert, op. cit. supra, n. 26.
34 Latcham and Emerson, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder De-
mocracy, 4 W. Res. L. R. 5, 19 (1952).
35 However Proxy Rule X-14A-8 has been used to propose a procedure
for stockholder nomination of directors on the management proxy form.
Illinois Central R. R. Co. proxy statement (1949). The objective of the
proposal, as asserted by the supporting statement was "to provide an al-
ternative to the one ticket type of election which has become characteristic
of all too many large corporations." The proposal received between 8-10%
of the vote cast. Emerson and Latcham, op. cit. supra, n. 29, at 819.
38 Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Law-
yer's Rule, 37 Va. L. R. 653, 689 (1951).
37 Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations, 24 Cornell L. Q. 483
(1939), and Notes, Proxy Solicitation Costs and Corporate Control, 61 Yale
L. J. 229, 232 (1952).
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The Commission evidenced willingness to broaden the dis-
closure philosophy when it circulated this idea of permitting
stockholders' nominations on the management proxy form in
connection with the 1942 revision of the proxy rules.35 Such an
amendment would go far toward effecting the objective of the
Act, which in the words of a former S. E. C. Counsel is to make
"the proxy device the closest practicable substitute for attend-
ance at the meeting." 39
Conclusion
The ability of the shareholder to exercise the duties and
rights of corporate democracy has been increased by the rather
unsettled new right, announced in the Steinberg and Fairchild
cases, that he can recoup proxy expenses from the corporation if
successful.
The various Secretaries of State were requested by the
writer, in his survey, to comment upon the desirability of the
right of reimbursement, as well as its statutory coverage. The
bulk of those answering declined to express an opinion, either
because of frank ignorance of the problem or because the ad-
ministrative function of their office precluded evaluation of policy
questions. The right of reimbursement was endorsed by the five
who offered personal and unofficial comments, although there
was no uniformity in their suggested schemes of implementation.
One's attitude concerning the value of the right and the
proposals to solidify it into statute or regulation depends upon
underlying assumptions concerning the status of the share-
holder. There are those who challenge the orthodox view that
the shareholders, as owners of the capital and employers of
management, should select the directors. The inefficiency of
shareholder democracy is said to require a stewardship by the
managers and faith by the owners. 40 Advocates of the right of
reimbursement, on the other hand, demand that shareholders be
given at least a periodic opportunity to confirm or disavow this
faith. They insist that positive benefits accrue to the corporation
38 Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H. R. 1821, and H. R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). The idea
was rejected as impracticable. Loss, Securities Regulation, 536 (1951).
39 Loss, Securities Regulation, 525 (1951).
40 See Martindell, Scientific Appraisal of Management (1950), and Dodd,
Modem Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54
Harv. L. R. 917, 921 (1941).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
350 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
from an intercourse of ideas and personalities rather than from
acquiescence in one-sided dictation.
Presupposing the validity of the traditional viewpoint, the
latter, it is necessary to consider how the objective of responsible
shareholder participation can best be served. The inapproximate
criteria of informing and campaigning, advanced by the courts in
order to gauge the reasonableness of proxy expenses, may aid in
distinguishing how far the privilege of reimbursement should be
extended. Modern proxy contests have assumed the proportions
of full scale political campaigns. A right of full reimbursement
contingent upon success stimulates such battles into becoming
even greater extravaganzas. Proposals which create avenues of
communication among the shareholders, by some limited formula
of reimbursement or by an alternative such as the use of the
management proxy statement, would seem better to reassimilate
the shareholder as an effective contributor in corporation affairs.
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